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YOU GOT SERVED: WHY AN EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN
EXTENSIONS OF SERVICE TIME AFTER
UNTIMELY SERVICE UNDER RULE 4(M)
GREGORY M. CAPONE'
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your mortal enemy is your adversary in a
litigation proceeding. After waiting until the day before the
relevant statute of limitations expires, he files a complaint
against you in federal court. He then fails to serve process on
you within the 120-day time period mandated by Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 As a result, you are unaware
of the impending action and are unable to effectively gather your
resources to defend the suit. Upon realizing that he missed the
deadline, your adversary moves for an extension of the service
period under Rule 6(b), but this motion is untimely as well
because the deadline to move for an extension has already
expired. Thus, before the case has even begun in earnest, your
adversary has already wasted a considerable amount of time: He
waited until the last minute to file the complaint, missed the
service deadline, and missed the extension deadline. Would you
be happy if a judge could grant the extension of service at his
own discretion despite your adversary's wrongdoings, or would
you argue that he should face a more difficult standard to keep
his suit alive? If your adversary secured the extension, would
you not argue that the judge has essentially rewarded him for
laziness and inattention to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exist to "secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"
I J.D. Candidate, 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2006,
Georgetown University. The author thanks Professors Robert Ruescher and Charles
Biblowit for their help and guidance and thanks his grandparents Frank and
Pauline Nick.
1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
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brought in federal court.2 Accordingly, Rule 4 states expressly
that a plaintiff must serve a defendant with process within 120
days after filing an action or else face the potential dismissal of
the suit.3 Service notifies a defendant of an impending suit and
allows a defendant to adequately prepare for litigation.4 Under
Rule 4, a defendant may bring a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss,
or a federal judge may dismiss the case on his or her own
initiative, if a plaintiff fails to properly serve a defendant within
the 120-day time limit prescribed in Rule 4(m).5 A plaintiff
whose case is dismissed for lack of service will normally be able
to re-file the action, as Rule 4 states that dismissal for lack of
proper service should be without prejudice.6 If the statute of
limitations has run between the time the suit is filed and the
time the suit is dismissed for lack of proper service, however, a
plaintiff will be unable to refile.7
Although the 120-day requirement in Rule 4(m) is firm, it is
not inflexible.8 A plaintiff who realizes that service may not be
achieved within 120 days may move for an extension of the
service period under Rule 6(b)-the provision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that concerns time extensions in
general. Rule 6(b) contains two separate standards for granting
a motion for time extension. If the plaintiff moves for an
extension before the relevant time period has elapsed, the court
will grant the extension if the delay was "for good cause."9
2 Id. 1.
I Id. 4(m). The rule states, in relevant part:
If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the
court-on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss
the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be
made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the
failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate
period.Id.
" See Elec. Specialty Co. v. Road & Ranch Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 309, 314 (9th
Cir. 1992).
r See id. 4(m),12(b)(5).
6 See id. 4(m).
7 See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1998), amended by 243
F.3d 234, 234 (6th Cir. 2001).
' See 4B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1137, at 341-42 (3d ed. 2002).
9 See FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b).
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Typically, this means that the extension is freely granted.'0 If,
however, the plaintiff moves to extend the time period after it
has expired, a court may only grant the extension if the plaintiff
can show that the delay resulted from "excusable neglect."1'
Rule 4(m) also allows courts to extend the 120-day service
period. Rule 4(m) has been interpreted by nearly every federal
court to contain two standards that govern service period
extensions. First, if the plaintiff can show "good cause" for the
failure to serve the defendant, the court must grant an extension.
Second, if the plaintiff fails to show "good cause" for the failure to
serve the defendant, the court may nonetheless grant an
extension according to its own judicial discretion.12 With service
extension standards emanating from two separate Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, it is not surprising that a circuit split has
developed regarding the extension of service time.
Courts disagree over which Rule governs a motion for an
extension after the 120-day service period has lapsed.13 The Fifth
and Sixth Circuits, relying on the standard laid out in Rule 6(b),
held that a plaintiff must demonstrate "excusable neglect" before
a judge may grant such an extension; on the other hand, the
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits held that Rule 4(m) allows
a judge to extend the service period at his own discretion. 14 It is
the tension between the "excusable neglect" standard in Rule 6(b)
and the "judicial discretion" standard in Rule 4(m) with which
this Note is concerned. 15
This Note argues that circuit courts should adopt Rule 6's
"excusable neglect" standard in lieu of Rule 4's "judicial
discretion" standard when a plaintiff fails to meet the 120-day
10 See Arroyo v. Wheat, 102 F.R.D. 516, 518 (D. Nev. 1984) (describing timely
Rule 6(b) extensions as "liberal").
11 See FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b).
12 Though Rule 4(m) does not explicitly state this proposition, courts generally
agree that Rule 4(m) should be interpreted to mean that "if good cause for the delay
is shown, the court must extend the time for service, while if good cause is not
shown, the court has a choice between dismissing the suit and giving the plaintiff
more time." United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2006)
(emphasis omitted).
is See id.
14 Compare id. (permitting a judge to use discretion in deciding whether to grant
an extension), with McGuire v. Turnbo, 137 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1998) (following
the "excusable neglect" standard).
15 For a more detailed analysis of the two standards and their application in
federal court, see infra Part II.
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service deadline and fails to move for an extension within the
120-day period. Part I of this Note examines Rule 4's statutory
history and its application in federal court. Part II discusses the
genesis of the circuit split and the approach taken by each side.
Part III uses a Seventh Circuit case, United States. v.
McLaughlin, to illustrate how the two standards may lead to
different, and sometimes unfavorable, results in federal court.
Finally, Part IV argues for an "excusable neglect" standard
because it more strongly upholds the purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, discourages misuse of judicial
discretion, adequately motivates plaintiffs to serve defendants
properly, and penalizes delinquent plaintiffs accordingly.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 4(M) AND ITS APPLICATION IN
FEDERAL COURT
Rule 4 governs service of process on a defendant in a civil
action and has been coined the "key instruction of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on the commencement of a federal civil
action."1 6 Stated simply, Rule 4 governs all things related to the
summons and its service upon a defendant, including the
contents of the summons itself; the requirements for proper
service upon individuals, corporations, and government entities,
waiver of service; and time requirements for proper service. 7
Given its importance to the commencement of an action, as well
16 David D. Siegel, Developments in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: Personal
Jurisdiction, Supplemental (Pendent and Ancillary) Jurisdiction, Venue, and
Removal, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 1996, at 7, 16
(Practising Law Institute ed., 1996)). Siegel goes on to note that, while Rule 3 bears
the title "Commencement of Action" and states that a civil action commences with
the filing of a complaint, "[ult is the summons and its service that really determines
how the case gets going." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Rule 4 and
its requirements are, practically speaking, much more crucial than those in Rule 3 to
a plaintiff in the commencement of a civil action. See id. Siegel further elaborates on
the importance of Rule 4 to the commencement of an action and the attention to
detail that a plaintiff and his lawyer must devote in order to successfully comply
with Rule 4:
Against the line or two of type that Rule 3 occupies are the many lines
that make up Rule 4. That ratio speaks worlds about the relative demands
that the two rules make on the lawyer's attention. Add in the fact that the
moment of commencement of the action is all bound up with that most
talented enemy of the plaintiff-the statute of limitations-and the
conclusion is plain: as demanding as Rule 4 may be, a mistake in its use
can be fatal.
Id.
'7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
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as its sheer volume of demands and requirements, Rule 4 "has no
small number of pitfalls."1 8 Though pitfalls abound throughout
Rule 4, this Note focuses on the difficulty encountered in Rule
4(m)-the 120-day time limit requirement for service of process
on a defendant. 19
A. The Evolution of Rule 4(m)
1. Rule 4 and Service Time Requirements Before 1983
Prior to 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
specify a time limit for service of process. Rule 4-enacted in
1938 as one of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
contained the familiar provisions dealing with "(1) the issuance,
form, and method of service of process upon different classes of
defendants; (2) the territorial limits of effective service; (3) the
return; and (4) the amendment of process."20 Conspicuously
absent was a provision that directed that service be made within
a specified time period. Presumably, this is because the original
"Rule 4(c) directed that all process was to be served by a [federal]
marshal, a deputy, or a person specially appointed by the
court."21 With impartial and presumably responsible federal
marshals administering service in the vast majority of cases, a
specific time limit was simply unnecessary.22 Courts, instead,
applied a "due diligence" standard to examine whether process
had been served inexcusably late on a defendant. 23  As David
Siegel explains in his commentary to Rule 4, "[a]s long as the
delay [in service of process] was not outrageous, the courts, when
an issue of tardiness came before them, were disposed to allow
late service, or new service to correct some perceived
imperfection in the first service. 24
18 Siegel, supra note 16.
19 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
20 Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of
Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (1987). For an
exhaustive account of the historical significance and development of service of
process in the United States, see id. at 1183-1214.
21 Id. at 1198.
22 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 31 ("That the marshals were the main process
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2. The 1983 Amendments to Rule 4: The Imposition of a 120-
Day Service Requirement and Its Application in Federal
Court
Rule 4 remained relatively unchanged until 1983 when
Congress amended it significantly in an effort to eliminate the
federal marshal's role in service of process in civil cases.25 In
effect, the 1983 amendments had four goals: "(1) to reduce the
role of the federal marshal in summons service, (2) to broaden
the category of persons authorized to serve process, (3) to
establish the availability of service by mail, and (4) to set specific
time limits for service of process."26 While seemingly unrelated,
each of these four goals served the same purpose. As marshals
were phased out of the service scheme, plaintiffs were given
greater responsibility in serving process.27 For instance, the
revised Rule 4(c) allowed for "any adult nonparty other than the
attorney to serve process."28 With such greater responsibility
came increased flexibility in service methods 29 and greater
judicial structure to the time period in which service could be
made. Plaintiffs, unlike federal marshals, could not be trusted to
deliver service in a reasonable time period; hence, the 120-day
service requirement was born.3" The original text of the 120-day
requirement-put into effect in 1983 as subdivision (j)-read as
follows:
(j) Summons: Time Limit for Service.
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon
a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint
and the party on whose behalf such service was required
cannot show good cause why such service was not made
25 See Sinclair, supra note 20, at 1198 (documenting that, in 1978, the Director
of the United States Marshal Service fervently lobbied the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules for a Rule 4 amendment because "the obligation to serve process in
federal civil litigations had become a serious financial burden" on the Marshal
Service).
26 Id. at 1211-12.
27 See id. at 1202-03.
28 Id. at 1203.
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (allowing proper service to be effected if service is
"in the state where the district court is located or where service is made"); see also
Sinclair, supra note 20, at 1213-14 ("Courts generally appear to espouse a rule of
construction that if the procedure followed can be characterized as within the
contemplation of either a recognized federal or viable state procedure, service will be
upheld.").
30 See Sinclair, supra note 20, at 1215-16.
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within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that
defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative
with notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivision
shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to
subdivision (i) of this rule.31
Judicial interpretation of Rule 4(j) was fairly
straightforward. A plaintiff had 120 days after a complaint was
filed to serve a defendant. If the plaintiff failed to serve the
defendant within the 120-day requirement, a defendant could
move to dismiss the action or the court could dismiss the action
sua sponte. A plaintiff could avoid such dismissal only upon
showing "good cause" for the failure of service.32 Thus, absent
good cause for the delay, a federal judge had no choice but to
dismiss the case (albeit without prejudice).33 This scenario, of
course, left little wiggle room for a tardy plaintiff, especially
considering that "inadvertence of counsel [did] not qualify as
'good cause'" to avoid a dismissal4.3  As one district court agreed,
"Rule 4(j) is meant to be strictly construed."35 Although the 120-
day requirement seemed excessively harsh on its face, struggling
plaintiffs were not without remedy-a plaintiff could move for an
extension of the service period under Rule 6(b), 36 thus proactively
avoiding the potentially disastrous effects that failure to serve a
defendant could bring under Rule 4(j).3
31 Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (codified as amended at
FED R. Civ. P. 4(m) (orignally codified as FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j))) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
32 See Bryant v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 530, 532 (W.D. Wash. 1987)
("[Rule] 4 requires that the court grant a defendant's Motion for Dismissal when
service of process has not been properly effected, unless the plaintiff can show good
cause why service was not effected according to the rule.").
" See id.
34 Ruley v. Nelson, 106 F.R.D. 514, 518 (D. Nev. 1985). For a more in-depth
discussion of what constitutes "good cause" under the Rule 4 time limit for service of
process, see infra Part I.B.
35 Ruley, 106 F.R.D. at 517.
36 See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b). For further discussion of Rule 6(b) as it relates to the
service of process requirements in Rule 4, see infra Part I.D.
31 See Arroyo v. Wheat, 102 F.R.D. 516, 518 (D. Nev. 1984) ("It was not intended
that Rule 4(j) would be enforced harshly; that is why liberal extensions of time are
permitted under Rule 6(b).").
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3. The 1993 Amendments: The Birth of the Modern-Day Rule
4(m) and Its Application in Federal Court
In 1993, only ten years after its introduction into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the subsection governing the time limit
for service of process was amended. Although much of the
statutory language was adopted wholesale from the former Rule
4(j), the new Rule 4(m) evidenced a congressional desire to
mitigate some of the harsher effects of Rule 4(j) on tardy
plaintiffs whose suits might otherwise be dismissed for lack of
good cause. The text of the amended Rule 4(m) stated:
(m) Time Limit for Service.
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint,
the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to
the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to
that defendant or direct that service be effected within a
specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for
service for an appropriate period. This subdivision does not
apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision
(f) or (j)(1).3"
Upon a cursory glance at 4(m), one might not actually
identify any significant changes from the former Rule 4(j).
Indeed, the time limit remains 120 days and upon failure to
serve, a defendant may move to dismiss via motion or the court
may dismiss the action on its own initiative. In addition, upon a
showing of "good cause" by a tardy plaintiff, the court must
extend the time for service and deny a defendant's motion to
dismiss.
There exists, however, a slight nuance in Rule 4(m) that
works heavily to a plaintiffs advantage. Rule 4(m), unlike the
former 4(j), states that upon a delinquent service, the court "shall
dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or
direct that service be effected within a specified time."39 Thus,
unlike under former Rule 4(j), courts are actually presented with
an option when a plaintiff fails to serve in 120 days and cannot
show good cause for the failure-instead of having no choice but
to dismiss the case, courts may "direct that service be effected
' FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (amended 2007).
39 Id. (emphasis added).
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within a specified time."4" Since the 1993 amendments, Rule
4(m) has been interpreted by nearly every circuit court to mean
the following: If a plaintiff fails to timely serve and can show
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the period for
service. If, however, a plaintiff fails to serve and cannot show
good cause for the failure, the court may dismiss the case or, at
its discretion, extend the time period for service.4 The Advisory
Committee's notes regarding the 1993 amendments support this
reading:
"[Rule 4(m)] provides that the court shall allow additional time
if there is good cause for the plaintiffs failure to effect service in
the prescribed 120 days, and authorizes the court to relieve a
plaintiff of the consequences of an application of this subdivision
even if there is no good cause shown."42
40 Id.
41 See Thompson v. Brown, 91 F.3d 20, 21 (5th Cir. 1996); Panaras v. Liquid
Carbonic Indus. Corp., 94 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1996); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Petrucelli v. Bohringer
& Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995)). The Fourth Circuit, however,
appears to be the only circuit in disagreement on this point. In Mendez v. Elliot, 45
F.3d 75 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit held that Rule 4(m) does not allow for
judicial discretion when plaintiff has failed to serve defendant within 120 days and
cannot show good cause for the failure, stating explicitly that "Rule 4(m) requires
that good cause be shown for obtaining an extension." Id. at 80. The court, however,
may have made a costly mistake. Indeed, in Mendez the court noted that "[former]
Rule 4(j) was edited without a change in substance and renumbered as Rule 4(m)."
Id. at 78. It appears as though the Fourth Circuit failed to observe the addition to
Rule 4(m) of the phrase "order that service be made within a specified time." FED. R.
CIV. P. 4(m). A number of district courts within the Fourth Circuit have refused to
follow the Mendez holding and, although Mendez has not been explicitly overruled, it
appears as though it is no longer good law. See Hammad v. Tate Access Floors, Inc.,
31 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526 (D. Md. 1999) (declining to follow Mendez and stating that
"[wihile the court acknowledges that it is not free to ignore valid Fourth Circuit
precedent merely because the overwhelming weight of circuit court authority is to
the contrary, the court believes that the continued vitality of Mendez is seriously in
doubt" (internal citation omitted)). At any rate, it appears as though the issue has
been settled, owing to Justice Ginsberg's dictum in a Supreme Court case from 1996.
See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662-63 (1996). Ginsberg confirmed
that "[miost recently, in 1993 amendments to the Rules, courts have been accorded
discretion to enlarge the 120-day period 'even if there is no good cause shown.'" Id.
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee's notes).
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee's note, reprinted in Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 573 (1993).
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In effect, Rule 4(m) relaxes the standard set forth in former Rule
4(j), although a plaintiff who seeks the benefit of the relaxed rule
essentially "throws himself on the the mercy of the district
court." 4 3
4. The 2007 Amendments
Rule 4(m) was again amended in 2007.44 Unlike the previous
two amendments to the rule, however, pertinent information was
neither added to nor detracted from the statutory language in
this amendment. The 2007 amendments were essentially made
to tidy up the language of Rule 4(m)-among others in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-and have no substantive effect
on their application in case law. Indeed, as the Committee Note
following Rule 4 states, "[t]he language of Rule 4 has been
amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to
make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are
intended to be stylistic only."45 The amended Rule 4(m) reads as
follows:
(m) Time Limit for Service.
If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the
complaint is filed, the court-on motion or on its own after
notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant or order that service be
made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time
for service for an appropriate period. This subdivision (m)
does not apply to service in a foreign country under Rule 4(f)
or 4(j)(1). 46
Judging from the statutory language of the 2007
amendments, it appears clear that Rule 4(m) has not changed in
substance from its 1993 version. Because the amendments do
43United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2006) (outlining the
judicial interpretation of Rule 4(m) and noting that "if good cause for the delay is
shown, the court must extend the time for service, while if good cause is not shown,
the court has a choice between dismissing the suit and giving the plaintiff more
time").






not affect the substance of Rule 4(m), it seems highly likely that
courts will continue to interpret Rule 4(m) as they did prior to
the 2007 amendments.
B. What is "Good Cause?"
Thus far, this Note has discussed the evolution of Rule 4(m)
and the judicial treatment it has received in federal court. This
Section examines the term "good cause" as it relates to a delay in
service of process and discusses the factors on which courts rely
when determining whether to extend the service period when no
such "good cause" is found.
1. Good Cause
Because a finding of "good cause" mandates an extension of
the service period, it is crucial for courts to maintain the difficult
balance between, as Charles Wright and Arthur Miller write,
"the clear intent of Rule 4(m) and the desire to provide litigants
their day in court. Insisting on a timely service of process and
assuring litigants a just adjudication on the merits of an action
are not inconsistent, but over-emphasis on either could lead to
undesired consequences."4 1 Courts have employed a multi-factor
balancing test to determine whether or not a plaintiff had good
cause for his or her delay in service.4 However, as David Siegel
points out, "[chases on what does and what doesn't qualify as
'good cause' for a time extension are all over the lot. There is no
way to reconcile all of them. . . ."' Thus, a consistent definition
of "good cause" has not emerged from the circuits.
Although the circuits differ slightly in their approaches, most
have engaged in a balancing test of sorts, using similar criteria to
determine whether good cause exists. 5°  For example, district
courts in the Second Circuit have declared that "[t]wo factors are
relevant: (1) the reasonableness and diligence of plaintiffs efforts
41 See 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 373.
' At this juncture it is important to note that the definition and application of
'good cause" has essentially remained constant since 1983 when the phrase was first
introduced into Rule 4. Thus no additional commentary is needed to differentiate
between "good cause" in pre-1993 cases and post-1993 cases. Of course, the actions
that a court may take after finding that no good cause exists varies drastically in
pre-1993 and post-1993 case law. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part
I.B.2.
'9 Siegel, supra note 16, at 40.
1 See infra notes 51-56.
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to serve; and (2) the prejudice to defendants from the delay."5'
Other circuits employ a more vague standard, looking to the pre-
1983 standard of "due diligence,"52 while still others equate "good
cause" with "excusable neglect," 3 the standard for extensions of
time under Rule 6(b)(1)(B).54 At any rate, nearly every circuit
agrees with the basic principle that "the purpose of Rule 4(m) is
to prod the slow-footed plaintiff, not to reward the crafty or
evasive defendant."55  Consequently, nearly every circuit
attempts to balance the plaintiffs good faith effort to effect
service with the defendant's avoidance of service and also
examines the prejudice done to both parties if the case were to be
decided one way or the other. 56
2. Factors Affecting a Court's Discretionary Extension of
Service Time Absent Good Cause
As noted earlier,57 the 1993 amendments allowed courts to
extend the service period for a plaintiff who fails to meet the 120-
day service requirement, even if the plaintiff cannot show good
cause for the delay. Although the standard employed by the
courts is described as "the sound exercise of its discretion,"58
courts have recognized that "[tihe rule specifies no criteria for the
exercise of mercy."5 9 The following factors have been considered
and weighed by most courts in determining whether to grant a
discretionary extension: lack of prejudice to defendant, relevant
statutes of limitations, the perceived efforts of defendants to
51 Bloomer v. City of N.Y., No. CV 89-592(RR), 1994 WL 92388, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 3, 1994).
52 See D'Amario v. Russo, 750 F. Supp. 560, 563 (D. R.I. 1990).
See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir.
1995) (noting that although Rule 4(m) does not define "good cause," it is generally
equated with "excusable neglect" under FRCP 6(b)(2)). For a further discussion of
Rule 6(b), the "excusable neglect" standard, and how it relates to Rule 4(m), see infra
Part I.D.
54 FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b)(1)(B).
5 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 394.
David Siegel is quick to point out, however, that "[pilaintiffs must bear in
mind that in the experience of the law generally, 'cause' implies a reason and 'good
cause' a good reason, a standard under which judges have not readily forgiven what
they perceive as mere laxity or casualness." Siegel, supra note 16, at 41.
"' See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the 1993 amendments to Rule 4(m)-
specifically, the addition of a clause which grants a court the discretion to extend the
service period for a delinquent plaintiff without showing of good cause).
8 McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998).
" United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2006).
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evade service, and the perceived efforts of plaintiffs to effect
service.60 Notably, many of these factors are also present in a
court's analysis of whether good cause exists for the plaintiffs
delay.
C. The Importance of a Dismissal Under Rule 4(m) Despite the
Statutory Requirement That the Dismissal Be Without
Prejudice
Rule 4(m) explicitly states that any dismissal for failure to
properly serve within 120 days is without prejudice.6' In most
circumstances, the upshot of a dismissal without prejudice is that
a plaintiff may once again file a suit in court as though the
original suit had never been filed.62  A dismissal without
prejudice, however, effectively precludes a plaintiff from refiling
suit if any relevant statutes of limitations have expired after
filing the original suit.6 3  As the Seventh Circuit noted,
"[d]ismissal... without prejudice does not mean without
consequence. If the case is dismissed and filed anew, the fresh
suit must satisfy the statute of limitations."64  Hence, the
dawdling plaintiff who waits until the end of the relevant statute
of limitations to bring suit risks an outright dismissal if he or she
fails to serve a defendant within the 120-day time period.
Although most courts examine the expiration of a statute of
60 See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
courts making extension decisions under Rule 4(m) may take the following factors
into account: statute of limitations bar, prejudice to the defendant, defendant having
actual notice of the lawsuit, defendant evading service, defendant concealing a defect
in attempted service, and length of delay before eventual service); McLaughlin, 470
F.3d at 700-01; Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998)
(listing the factors included in a district court's decision to make an extension at its
discretion, but noting, quite succinctly, that a discretionary extension will not be
granted if the plaintiff is "largely to blame" for the delay). Efaw appears to present
the most complete list of factors that courts routinely analyze when deciding to grant
an extension without good cause. Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1041.
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
62 See 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 379-87.
See id. ("The dismissal-without-prejudice provision allows a plaintiff to refile
the complaint as if it had never been filed, but it does not provide relief from
defenses based on the passage of time, such as the statute of limitations.").
' Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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limitations as a factor in considering whether to extend the
service period, the mere expiration of a statute of limitations
alone will not necessarily tip the scales in the plaintiffs favor. 5
D. An Ace up the Sleeve: Plaintiffs Ability To Move for an
Extension of Service Time Via Rule 6(b) and Its Relationship
with Rule 4(m)
The difficulty in determining whether a court should grant a
service extension is made more complex by Rule 6(b). Rule 6(b)
governs time for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general
and allows a plaintiff to move for an extension of time in certain
circumstances.66 By its terms, Rule 6(b) applies to plaintiffs
seeking an extension of the 120-day period for service of process.
The statutory text of Rule 6(b) reads, in part, as follows:
(b) Extending Time.
(1) In General. When an act may or must be done within a
specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the
time:
(A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or
if a request is made, before the original time or its
extension expires; or
(B) on motion made after the time has expired if the
party failed to act because of excusable neglect.
Rule 6(b)'s text makes clear that a motion for an extension of
time is more freely granted when the motion is made before the
expiration of the relevant time period that the plaintiff is seeking
to extend. The first prong of Rule 6(b), which concerns motions
made before the expiration of the relevant time period, allows a
judge to grant a motion for extension as long as it is made "for
good cause."68 As noted earlier, extensions made in such a timely
manner are liberally granted. 9 Conversely, if a plaintiff is late
in moving to extend the time period, a judge may only grant the
motion if the delay was the result of "excusable neglect." °
"Excusable neglect" is, unsurprisingly, another term of art. The
65See Johnson v. Fleet, 371 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157-58 (D. Conn. 2005).
66See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
67 Id. 6(b)(1).
6 See id.
69 See Arroyo v. Wheat, 102 F.R.D. 516, 518 (D. Nev. 1984); see also supra note
10 and accompanying text.
70 See FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b)(1).
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standard accounts for essentially all of the relevant
circumstances of a case and has been likened to the "good cause"
standard used in Rule 4(m).7 It is the relationship between Rule
4(m)'s "judicial discretion" standard and Rule 6(b)'s "excusable
neglect" standard that provides the foundation for the circuit
split with which this Note is concerned.
II. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT VERSUS JUDICIAL DISCRETION: TWO
METHODS BY WHICH CIRCUITS HAVE HANDLED THE QUANDRY OF
THE PLAINTIFF WHO MOVES FOR AN EXTENTION OF THE SERVICE
PERIOD AFTER THE 120-DAY TIME LIMIT HAS ALREADY EXPIRED
As noted earlier, courts roundly agree that a tardy plaintiffs
case must survive a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff can show
"good cause" for the failure to serve and may survive absent
"good cause" if the court so allows in its discretion.72 However,
while courts have reached a consensus on the interpretation of
Rule 4(m) as it stands alone, courts disagree over the standard
that guides a court when a plaintiff moves for an extension of
service time after the 120-day service requirement has expired.
The following Section analyzes the two approaches that circuits
have followed.
A. The Judicial Discretion Approach
The "judicial discretion" approach-adopted by the Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-is quite simple. Upon an initial
motion to enlarge the time period for service, a court need look
only to Rule 4(m).73 As noted earlier, a plaintiff under Rule 4(m)
need not show good cause for the delay (although good cause
certainly makes things easier on the plaintiff) but may instead
rely upon the court's discretion in allowing his or her case to
survive.74 In a recent Seventh Circuit case, the court opined that
the differences in standards between Rule 6(b) and Rule 4(m)
may have been accidental or may be disparate because Rule 6(b)
7 See United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700-01 (7th Cir. 2006)
("Neglect is excusable (though not justifiable-'neglect' implies lack of justification)
if there is a reason, which needn't be a compelling reason, to overlook it. . ., but it
will not suffice if no excuse at all is offered."); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (likening the excusable neglect
standard to the good cause standard in Rule 4(m)).
72 See supra Part I.A.3.
See McLaughlin, 470 F.3d at 700.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
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considerations often concern the finality of litigation while Rule
4(m) considerations merely concern the commencement of
litigation:
Rule 6(b)(2) is less generous to dawdlers than Rule 4(m), not
only in requiring the plaintiff to show excusable neglect if his
motion for an extension is itself untimely, but also in not
requiring the judge to grant the motion even if good cause is
shown. The difference in standards may be accidental, or may
reflect the fact that ignoring litigation deadlines delays the
finality of litigation ... whereas missing service deadlines
merely postpones the commencement of litigation.75
At any rate, the circuits that follow the judicial discretion
approach need not look to the text of 6(b) at all during the initial
motion for extension; Rule 4(m) alone governs the extension.
Rule 6(b) is, however, implicated if the plaintiff is granted a first
extension, misses the extended deadline, and then moves to
extend the service period a second time.76 Practically speaking,
the judicial discretion approach gives the plaintiff an extra
opportunity to procrastinate before facing the harsher standard
in Rule 6(b).
B. The Excusable Neglect Approach
The excusable neglect approach-adopted by the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits-is also simple. Whereas the judicial discretion
approach ignores Rule 6(b) and follows the Rule 4(m) standard,
the excusable neglect approach does the opposite. When a
plaintiff moves to enlarge the period for service after the 120-day
period has expired, followers of the excusable neglect approach
look simply to the language of Rule 6(b), drawing from it the rule
that a court may only grant such an extension upon a showing of
excusable neglect.77 Interestingly, these courts have often failed
to explain their reasoning.18 Rather, the court opinions read as
though there is no choice at all between approaches and that an
75 McLaughlin, 470 F.3d at 700 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
76 See id. ("Rule 4(m) authorizes the district court, in a case in which the 120
days have elapsed, to 'direct that service be effected within a specified time'; only if
the plaintiff failed to meet the new deadline and filed a motion for an extension of
time would Rule 6(b)(2) come into play." (emphasis omitted)).




explanation of the choice to follow Rule 6(b) is superfluous.79 As
this Note later explains, the absence of such an explanation is
not surprising.8 °
III. UNITED STATES V. MCLAUGHLIN: HIGHLIGHTING THE
DIFFERENCES IN PRACTICAL APPLICATION BETWEEN THE
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT APPROACHES
The practical differences between the excusable neglect
approach and the judicial discretion approach are best
exemplified in United States v. McLaughlin, a case in which the
Seventh Circuit adopted the judicial discretion approach in lieu
of the excusable neglect approach.8' The court's choice effectively
dictated the outcome of the case in McLaughlin and will likely
influence the outcome of future cases in the Seventh Circuit.
In McLaughlin, defendant Thomas McLaughlin allegedly
accumulated nearly three million dollars in unpaid income
taxes.8 2 The federal government brought suit in federal district
court but waited until only five days before the expiration of the
lengthy ten-year statute of limitations to file its complaint.8 3
Because McLaughlin did not waive service, the federal
government was required to properly serve process on
McLaughlin. 8' The federal government, citing "unspecified
budgetary considerations," failed to hire a professional process
server to serve McLaughlin and instead instructed an IRS officer
to serve McLaughlin.8 5  The IRS officer left the complaint at
McLaughlin's office, handing the complaint to his daughter
because McLaughlin was not present.8" Unbeknownst to the IRS
officer, such an attempt at service was improper under Rule 4.87
By the time the government's lawyer realized that process had
not been properly served, the 120-day service deadline had
'9 See id.
80 See infra Part IV.
81 470 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2006).
82 See id. at 699.
8 Id.
8 See id.
11 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Id.
87 See id.; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e)(2). The Seventh Circuit noted that service
was not proper at the office because "there might be so many people at a defendant's
place of business that process left with one of them might very well not reach the
defendant." McLaughlin, 470 F.3d at 699.
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expired. The government then moved to extend the service
period, which the district judge granted." The government only
then hired a professional process server, who was unable to
properly serve McLaughlin during the extension period. The
government moved again for an extension, which was again
granted by the district judge.8 9 Defendant was finally served
during this second extension period, 271 days after the initial
complaint was filed.90 McLaughlin moved to dismiss for lack of
proper service.91 Although the district court found that the
government did not show good cause for the delay under Rule
4(m), the court nonetheless denied McLaughlin's motion to
dismiss.92
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted Rule 4(m)'s judicial
discretion approach and determined that the government's
untimely motion to extend the service period was not fatal to its
case, stating that "[tihis case is a good example of the wisdom of
Rule 4(m) in allowing a judge to excuse a delay in service even if
the plaintiff has no excuse at all." 3 The court held that the
Seventh Circuit should use the judicial discretion approach the
first time a plaintiff moves for an extension after the 120-day
service period has expired and that the excusable neglect
approach should only come into play when a plaintiff moves for
another extension after the first extension has also expired.94
Crucial to the analysis in this case was whether the
government had good cause for its delay in service. As noted, the
government did not hire a professional server due to "budgetary
considerations. The court, however, recognized that such
budgetary considerations did not prevent the government from
eventually hiring a professional server.96 Given the federal
government's sophistication and resources, there is little reason
to believe that the government had good cause in not hiring a
professional server and instead entrusting service to an IRS
officer who was evidently unfamiliar with proper service under





9 Id. at 701.
See id. at 700.
9 Id. at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 701.
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Rule 4. Also relevant to the analysis was whether McLaughlin
actively evaded service. Although it indeed seemed suspicious
that a professional server could not reach McLaughlin for
months, the district court found, and the Seventh Circuit
accepted, that McLaughlin did not evade service. Thus, as the
court noted, "the government has not much in the way of excuses
for missing the deadline in this case by almost five months."8
Because the government had essentially no excuse for failing
to properly serve McLaughlin, the excusable neglect approach
would yield a different outcome in McLaughlin than that
resulting from use of the judicial discretion approach. Indeed,
the court even noted that "it could make a difference in this case
whether excusable neglect is a precondition to granting an
untimely motion for an extension of time within which to serve
the complaint."99  The court recognized that "[n]eglect is
excusable ... if there is a reason, which needn't be a compelling
reason, to overlook it... but it will not suffice if no excuse at all
is offered or if the excuse is so threadbare as to make the neglect
inexplicable." 10 In McLaughlin, the government argued that
budgetary considerations prevented it from hiring a process
server and that McLaughlin evaded service. Because the court
was persuaded by neither argument,10 1 it appears as though the
government's excuse was indeed so threadbare that its neglect
was inexcusable. Furthermore, because some courts equate
excusable neglect with good cause, and because the McLaughlin
Court found that no good cause existed, it likely would have
granted McLaughlin's motion to dismiss if it employed the
excusable neglect approach.
A compelling aspect of the case is the manner in which the
Seventh Circuit used its "discretion" to grant the government's
time extension. Although aware that the government was
partially undeserving of an extension because of its errors in
serving process and its delay in filing the complaint until five
days prior to the ten-year statute of limitations, the court paid lip
service to these factors. Instead, the court focused heavily on the
fact that McLaughlin was apparently not prejudiced by the
9' See id.
98 Id.
I Id. at 700.
11 Id. at 700-01 (citations omitted) (parenthetical omitted).
101 See id. at 699, 701.
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government's failure to serve process on him.'02 While prejudice
to the parties is certainly a factor in granting a discretionary
extension, it is not the only factor. 10 3 In a somewhat subtle
manner, the court mentioned the government's inexcusable
conduct without actually balancing it against its effects on
McLaughlin.
Furthermore, the court failed to note that McLaughlin may
have actually been prejudiced by the government-not directly
because of the improper service, but rather because if the suit
proceeded, he would need to recall events, witnesses, and
documents that gave rise to a cause of action ten years earlier.
The government clearly could have brought suit earlier in the
statute of limitations but declined to do so. Thus, while the delay
in service may not have directly prejudiced McLaughlin, the
court may not have been correct in stating that the situation
caused him "zero prejudice." °4
The opinion's final paragraph sheds some light on the
manner in which the court employed its discretion in granting
the extension. The court expressed displeasure that a dismissal
would give McLaughlin a three-million-dollar windfall, stating
that "[dismissal] would have amounted to fining the government
$3 million for doing something that did no harm to anyone and
handing over the proceeds of the fine to a wrongdoer."10 5 Thus,
the court revealed what may have been its true motivation in
deciding the case. As the next Section discusses, this manner of
judicial discretion is but one reason why the circuits should adopt
the excusable neglect standard.
IV. THE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT STANDARD IS BOTH CONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND SERVES AS A MORE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF SERVICE OF
PROCESS RULES IN FEDERAL COURT
The excusable neglect standard is preferable to the judicial
discretion standard when a plaintiff moves to extend the time for
service of process after the 120-day time period has expired.
First, the statutory language of Rule 6(b) clearly evinces a
legislative intent to impose a relatively harsh standard upon
102 See id. at 700-01.
103 See supra Part I.B.2.




plaintiffs who fail to meet the relevant deadlines of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, the excusable neglect standard
more accurately reflects the legislative intent to define strict but
fair standards in the service of process rule following the 1983
and 1993 amendments to Rule 4. Third, the excusable neglect
standard more strongly motivates plaintiffs to meet their
deadlines and justly penalizes plaintiffs whose inexcusable
failures to meet such deadlines prolong litigation proceedings.
Finally, the excusable neglect standard is favorable because it
provides concrete guidelines for courts to follow and helps to
reduce the potential inequities that accompany the exercise of
judicial discretion.
A. A Detailed Analysis of the Text of 4(m) and 6(b) Evidences the
Excusable Neglect Standard as the Proper Standard for
Extensions After the 120-day Deadline Has Passed
The Seventh Circuit in McLaughlin noted that Rule 4(m)
and Rule 6(b) contain seemingly different standards regarding an
extension of the service time after the 120-day period has
expired.10 6 An examination of both statutes, however, suggests
that Rule 4(m) was not intended to operate independently of Rule
6(b) and that Rule 6(b) was not intended to yield to Rule 4(m).
Stated simply, Rule 6-including its subsections-applies to the
entirety of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless specified
otherwise. The statutory language of Rules 6(a) and 6(b) fully
supports this notion. Rule 6(a) begins with the phrase, "[t]he
rules apply in computing any time period specified in these
rules.""°7 Such a phrase clearly evidences the legislative desire
for Rule 6(a) to apply to each and every Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. In similar fashion, Rule 6(b) begins with, "[w]hen an
act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may,
for good cause, extend the time."10 Clearly then, Rule 6(b) was
intended to apply to each and every instance in which a Federal
Rule requires that an act be done within a certain time frame.
Undoubtedly, Rule 4(m) fits this description perfectly as it
106 See id. at 700.
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
108 Id. 6(b)(1).
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demands that a specific act (service of process on the defendant)
be done by a specific person (a plaintiff) within a specific time
period (120 days after filing the complaint).1"9
Nowhere within Rule 6(b) can one find any language that
allows Rule 4(m) to operate independently of Rule 6(b). Indeed, if
Rule 4(m) was to encompass a standard other than that laid out
in 6(b), it could have stated so on its face. In fact, the statutory
language of Rule 6(b) actually does contain a number of
exceptions to which 6(b) does not apply. The final sentence in
Rule 6(b) proclaims that "[a] court must not extend the time to
act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b),
except as those rules allow."110 Thus, Rules 50(b) and (c)2, 52(b),
59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b) operate independently of Rule 6(b),
and the standards to extend those respective time periods, if they
so exist, are evident in the separate rules themselves."1 Had the
drafters intended for Rule 4(m) to have its own, more lenient
standard for enlarging the time period for service, they could
have simply added Rule 4(m) to the laundry list of statutes to
which Rule 6(b) does not apply.
In the same vein, Rule 4(m) contains no language that
contemplates a plaintiffs motion to extend the service period.
Rule 4(m) clearly addresses a defendant's motion to dismiss and
lays out the "good cause" standard for an automatic extension of
the service time, but it is silent on a plaintiffs motion to extend
the service period. Furthermore, considering that Rule 4(m) was
enacted fewer than twenty-five years ago and has since been
amended multiple times, there was ample opportunity to address
the enlargement issue in the text of Rule 4(m). If Rule 4(m) was
intended to operate independently of Rule 6(b), it could have said
so in the language of Rule 4(m) or it could have at least
addressed a plaintiffs motion for enlargement. Because Rule
6(b) contemplates a standard for enlargement motions that
applies to each and every Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, it
seems quite clear that the excusable neglect standard in Rule
6(b) controls.





Finally, support for the excusable neglect standard is evident
in the manner in which courts have chosen one standard over the
other. In McGuire v. Turnbo 12 and Turner v. City of Taylor,113
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, respectively, chose the excusable
neglect standard in Rule 6(b) as if there was no alternative. 1 4
Without explanation and without hesitation, both courts,
independently of one another, turned to the statutory language of
6(b) for guidance in determining the standard to employ when
the plaintiff moved to enlarge the service period after the 120
days had expired." 5  Simply put, both courts recognized that
Rule 6(b) was the place in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
which the controlling law was found.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
McLaughlin,"6 wrestled with the issue of which standard to use
before selecting the judicial discretion standard and first
discredited the excusable neglect standard. The Seventh Circuit
speculated that the divergent standards in 4(m) and 6(b) were an
accident" 7 and distinguished Rule 4(m) from Rule 6(b) because
6(b) was enacted to ensure the "finality of litigation," whereas
4(m) concerns "the commencement of litigation.""' Neither
argument is particularly appealing.
It is highly unlikely that the divergent standards in 4(m) and
6(b) flow from a legislative gaffe. As noted earlier, 4(m) has been
revised twice since 1983, including once post-McLaughlin. If a
mistake was made by including two standards, the problem could
have easily been remedied one way or the other in the 2007
amendments. For fourteen years, no legislative body has seen
the need to clarify itself, so it is simply unlikely that a mistake
was made in the first place. Furthermore, that the Rule 6(b)
standard should only govern matters of "finality" in litigation is
untrue. Again, the statutory text of Rule 6 unambiguously
purports to govern all time periods in the Federal Rules except
the rules mentioned in the last sentence of Rule 6(b). There are
no qualifying remarks in the text of Rule 6(b) regarding the
finality or commencement of actions, and a court would be wise
112 137 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 1998).
3 412 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
114 See McGuire, 137 F.3d at 324; Turner, 412 F.3d at 650.
115 See id.; see also McGuire, 137 F.3d at 324.
116 470 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2006).
117 See id. at 700.
18 See id.
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not to invent such an argument. In summation, the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits looked to the plain meaning of Rule 6(b) and
applied it without hesitation, whereas the Seventh Circuit
unreasonably stretched its logic to discount Rule 6(b) as
inapplicable.
B. The Excusable Neglect Standard More Strongly Serves the
Purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
states that the Rules exist to "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."119 The following
analysis of the excusable neglect standard with respect to these
three goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shows that the
excusable neglect standard is indeed preferable to the judicial
discretion standard.
1. Just Determination of Cases
The excusable neglect standard adequately allows for the
"just" determination of cases. One of the explicit purposes of
Rule 4 is to ensure that a defendant is adequately notified of an
impending suit and to allow the defendant to prepare materials
for litigation. 120 It is this prejudice done upon a defendant that
may turn the 120-day requirement from one of procedural
technicality to one of substantive merit. While it may seem
ridiculous to deprive a plaintiff of his day in court due to a
procedural time limit, the limit itself exists to protect the
defendant's substantive ability to defend on the merits. Thus,
while the tardy plaintiff violates a procedural rule, the
consequence of the violation is often one of substance.
The plaintiff who waits until the statute of limitations has
nearly run, then fails to serve the defendant within 120 days,
then fails to move for an extension of the service period, increases
the probability that the defendant suffered prejudice in the case.
Hence, the balancing act between the "open-door policy of the
federal court system and the mandate in Rule 1121 is preserved
in that a tougher standard for a subpar plaintiff increases the
chances that (1) lazy or delinquent plaintiffs will justifiably lose
119 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
120 See Hoffman v. United Telecomms., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1463, 1483 (D. Kan.
1983).
121 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 370.
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their day in court, and (2) plaintiffs who may potentially
prejudice defendants will be motivated to adhere to the deadlines
prescribed in the Federal Rules. The excusable neglect approach
takes this balancing act into consideration without allowing a
court to flippantly grant the extension if no prejudice is apparent,
as the Seventh Circuit unjustifiably did in McLaughlin. In other
words, if a defendant suffers no prejudice as a result of the
improper service, it will be relatively easier for the plaintiff to
satisfy the otherwise difficult excusable neglect standard.
2. Speedy Determination of Cases
The excusable neglect standard also ensures "speedy"
litigation. First, the standard motivates plaintiffs to accomplish
service early in the 120-day requirement. Plaintiffs who attempt
service relatively soon after filing the complaint but encounter
difficulties serving the defendant will be able to take advantage
of the freely granted extensions under Rule 6(b) when the motion
is made prior to the expiration of the 120 days. Furthermore, the
higher standard for tardy motions to extend will also motivate
plaintiffs to file their complaints well within the statutes of
limitations. As David Siegel writes, Rule 4's "very generosity
may prove the plaintiffs undoing, lulling the plaintiff into
casualness until the bell is about to ring. If the period lapses
when the statute of limitations is near at hand, the result can be
disaster."'22 In other words, "[p]laintiffs who manage to file the
complaint just under the wire will have to stone with punctilio
now for the laxity of which they were guilty before."123 The
gravity of a smaller margin of error regarding service of process
should motivate plaintiffs to file their claims well before the
expiration of the relevant statutes of limitations. This will
certainly help to avoid egregious lapses in time like the one in
McLaughlin, where the plaintiff waited until a few days prior to
the expiration of a ten-year statute of limitations and then failed
to properly serve the defendant until 271 days after filing the
complaint. Such egregious delays likely inflict prejudice upon a
defendant, who may not even recall the events that gave rise to
the cause of action a decade earlier. 2 4
122 Siegel, supra note 16, at 31-32.
'" Id. at 37.
124 For a more thorough examination of McLaughlin, see supra Part III.
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3. Inexpensive Determination of Cases
The excusable neglect standard is also consistent with the
purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is to
provide "inexpensive" litigation of matters. 25 It may be true that
the harsher standard applied to extensions will increase the
number of cases dismissed without prejudice, thus forcing some
plaintiffs to refile. The negligible cost increases in refiling will,
however, be heavily outweighed by the decreased case backlog in
federal court. As Charles Wright and Arthur Miller point out,
higher standards for service "should motivate the serving party
to complete the task expeditiously, [and] will help ease the
increasing backlog of cases in the federal courts and the delay in
their adjudication."12 6
C. The Excusable Neglect Standard Provides a More Structured
Approach for Judges To Follow and Helps Limit the Potential
for Inconsistent or Inequitable Decisions Both Across and
Within Circuits
The excusable neglect standard, while founded in equity and
designed to account for the unique circumstances of each case,
provides a more concrete rule than the judicial discretion
standard, thus allowing judges to approach cases with a
predictability that more likely ensures a just outcome. In effect,
the excusable neglect standard is similar to the judicial
discretion standard with one major difference: The excusable
neglect standard is much harder to satisfy and, therefore,
provides a safeguard for defendants against a judge with a bias
toward an undeserving plaintiff. While both standards purport
to examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding a
particular case, "the excusable neglect standard has consistently
been held to be 'strict,' and can be met only in extraordinary
cases."127 Hence, a judge is at least provided with some guidance
125 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
126 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 370.
127 Marsh v. Richardson, 873 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Reinsurance
Co. of Am. Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 808 F.2d 1249, 1251 (7th Cir.
1987)). Because both standards examine a totality of the circumstances, but the
excusable neglect standard is more difficult to satisfy, it is not surprising that some
courts have likened the excusable neglect standard to the good cause standard in
Rule 4(m); both standards examine the totality of circumstances and both standards
are more difficult to satisfy compared to the judicial discretion standard. See MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995).
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as to how the various equitable factors should weigh against one
another, and a defendant is properly protected against an
undeserving plaintiff who makes a sympathetic appeal to a
biased judge.
Said one commenter regarding the use of judicial discretion
standards in relation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The problem, of course, with such an individualized approach
is that it necessarily relies upon the differential knowledge,
skill, interest, and attention of district court judges. Wholesale
reliance upon the wisdom of an imperfect, substantially
overworked federal judiciary is simply far from the bright-line
rule that is increasingly the ideal of contemporary
adjudication.128
Hence, allowing for broad judicial discretion is not only wasteful
of precious judicial resources, but also runs contrary to the
purpose of the Federal Rules-providing for the just adjudication
of each matter.
CONCLUSION
Service of process is crucial to the commencement of an
action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the
responsibilities of serving process on a defendant were shifted to
the plaintiff with the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules,
federal courts have struggled to "harmonize the open-door policy
of the federal court system and the mandate in Rule 1 promoting
the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.' "129 While courts of course prefer to dispose of lawsuits on
the merits, a plaintiff who fails to serve a defendant within the
120-day timetable, fails to show good cause for the failure, fails to
move for an extension within the 120-day period, and files the
suit so close to the expiration of the statute of limitations that a
dismissal without prejudice would preclude the plaintiff from
bringing suit again simply does not deserve a lenient standard in
assessing whether to dismiss the case. An excusable neglect
standard, set forth clearly in Rule 6(b), should be employed in
these types of situations. The standard is harsh but fair,
especially considering the degree to which a plaintiff must
dawdle to implicate Rule 6(b). Ultimately, the excusable neglect
128 Shaun P. Martin, Substitution, 73 TENN. L. REV. 545, 603 (2006).
129 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 370 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
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standard takes into account all equitable circumstances of the
situation without affording judges too much discretion over the
ultimate disposition of the case and should be adopted in lieu of
the less preferable judicial discretion approach.
